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A salary cap system is presently used by both the AFL and NRL with the 
stated objective of creating a more even competition. Although the salary 
cap can be viewed as creating a situation where players are being 
deliberately underpaid, the author argues that there is overall benefit, even 
to the players, in having a salary cap in operation. Such benefit includes a 
more even competition, which then provides for a more stable financial 
situation for the league and the players, and a more interesting competition 
for the spectators. The author therefore argues that, after applying the 
Nordenfelt test, salary caps in professional team sports do represent a 
reasonable restraint of trade. It is also suggested that the principles of 
contract law play an important role in protecting the rights of the players. 
Introduction 
The salary caps implemented by both the Australian Football League (AFL) 
and the National Rugby League (NRL) were the subject of much publicity 
during the later half of 2002 when systematic breaches of the system were 
uncovered in both codes. Large fines and the loss of either draft selections or 
competition points were the harsh penalties that were subsequently handed out 
by the respective governing bodies. 
What has also made headlines in the AFL has been the number of clubs who 
hav~been forced to trade big name players in the last few years, including 
players still under contract, in order to remain under the salary cap. I Other 
players meanwhile agreed to take pay cuts from their existing contracts to help 
ensure their club remained within the salary cap.2 A question then arises as to 
whether this forced trading of players and the taking of pay cuts means that 
a salary cap system represents an unreasonable restraint of trade. 
This paper, therefore, will explore the salary cap system in the context of 
the restraint of trade doctrine. This will be achieved by examining the use and 
suggested benefits obtained by the operation of a salary cap under the concept 
of protectable interests. However, a major component of the paper involves an 
examination of what the rules of a salary cap allow, in practice, within 
sporting organisations. It is therefore very much a practical paper which looks 
at a number of specific case examples to see how the implementation of a 
salary cap has affected the payment particular players have received, or 
affected their ability to select the employer of their choice. Finally, the paper 
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can also be viewed as a response to Buti's 1999 Journal of Contract Law 
article3 which concluded that the salary cap system represents an unreasonable 
restraint of trade. 
The Restraint of Trade Doctrine: The Nordenfelt Test 
The test for a restraint of trade was developed by Lord Macnaghten in 
Nordenfelt v Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Company4 (Nordenfelt) 
where his Lordship stated that: 5 
It is a sufficient justification, and indeed it is the only justification, if the restraint is 
reasonable - reasonable, that is, in reference to the interests of the parties 
concerned and reasonable in reference to the interests of the public, so framed and 
so guarded as to afford adequate protection to the party in whose favour it is 
imposed, while at the same time it is in no way injurious to the public. 
Thus, the restraint must afford no more than adequate protection to the party 
in whose favour it is imposed, while in Adamson v New South Wales Rugby 
League Ltd6 (Adamson) it was also held that the restraint is to be tested 'by 
reference to what the restraint entitles the parties to do rather than what they 
intend to do or have actually done'.7 
Another relevant factor is the concept of protectable interests, for as Carter 
and Harland8 point out this concept lies at the heart of the justification of 
restraint of trade, as a covenantee is entitled to protect certain interests. 
However, if there are no protectable interests then the covenant in question 
will be regarded as being unreasonable. 
Protectable Interests 
When looking at this concept, the protectable interests must first be identified. 
For ipstance in GKR Karate Australia v P & M Thomas9 , GKR operated a 
busiJess that conducted karate classes throughout Australia. A clause was 
incorporated into the employment contract that restrained a manager from 
working, for a period of three years, with similar companies within 20 
kilometres of any training or administrative centre run by GKR.IO It was stated 
by Martin J that the protect able interests of GKR had to be identified, in this 
case it being the extensive information the manager, Paul Thomas, had of 
clients, instructors, distributors and venues. I I The assessment of whether the 
restraint exceeded what was necessary to guard GKR's protectable interests 
required taking into consideration the geographical area in which GKR 
3 A Buti, 'Salary Caps in Professional Team Sports: an Unreasonable Restraint of Trade' 
(1999) 14JCL 130. 
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p 588. 
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operated its business, and the position of the defendant within the 
organisation. 12 It was then held that the clause in question encompassed an 
area that was far wider than what was necessary to protect GKR's legitimate 
interests, with the three-year period also being held to be excessive. 13 By 
contrast it was held in Woolworths Limited v Olsen l4 that Woolworths had a 
properly protectable interest in securing the right to impose a 
post-employment restraint of six months, given the fact that the defendant had 
access to valuable confidential information, 15 and the fact that the restraint did 
not prevent Olson from earning a living as Woolworths was subject to a 
restraint payment. 16 
In regard to the situation relevant to this paper, namely the implementation 
of a labour market control by a sporting organisation, the concern of a 
governing body wanting to ensure that the teams compete on an equal footing 
has been held to be a justification for a restraint on members of the teamsP 
In Adamson for instance, a case involving a challenge to the New South Wales 
Rugby League's (NSWRL) draft system, it was held by the primary judge, 
Justice Hill, that there were three legitimate interests of the league. These were 
the desirability of a strong and competitive competition with teams as evenly 
matched as possible; all the clubs competing to be as financially viable as 
possible; the clubs being in a position to retain players engaged by them and, 
in particular, rich clubs not being able to plunder the weaker clubs of their 
players. 18 On appeal, Gummow J likewise stated that these were the legitimate 
interests of the league. 19 
The High Court in Buckley v Tutty,2° although declaring the NSWRL's 
retain and transfer system to be an unreasonable restraint of trade, also 
acknowledged that it was a legitimate objective of the league to ensure that the 
teams in the competition be as strong and as well matched as possible.21 
Henry J in Kemp v New Zealand Rugby Football League Inc22 meanwhile 
,accepted that the league had a legitimate and relevant interest in maintaining 
}the strength of the game in New Zealand. 
This objective of obtaining an even competition is based on the peculiar 
economics of the sports industry,23 which is why professional team sports 
have a tendency to be highly regulated and cooperative organisations with 
rules and restrictive product and labour market controls that both the clubs and 
the players have to obey. This is because the attractiveness of competition, it 
is argued, depends on a high degree of uncertainty about the result of any 
competition, and so the measures are seen as reducing the chances of a few 
12 [2000J SASC 160 at [14J. 
13 [2000J SASC 160 at [l9J. 
14 [2004] NSWCA 372. 
15 [2004J NSWCA 372 at [6IJ-[62J. 
16 [2004J NSWCA 372 at [68]. 
17 Carter and Harland, above, n 8, p 588. 
18 (1990) 27 FCR 535 at 560. 
19 (1991) 31 FCR 242 at 294. 
20 (1971) 125 CLR 353. 
21 (1971) 125 CLR 353 at 377. 
22 [1989J 3 NZLR 463 at 468-9 .. 
23 BUfi, above, n 3 at 142. 
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teams dominating the competition through their economic power.24 
The protectable interests of a league will therefore be considered when 
examining the implementation and use of salary caps. However, the paper will 
first of all take a look at the other methods that can be adopted in regard to 
controlling payments to players, namely the maximum wage restraint. 
Maximum Wages 
While salary caps are relatively new in Australia, it should be noted that prior 
to their inception a maximum wage restraint was utilised to try and maintain 
a limit on player salaries. A maximum wage restraint sets an upper limit on 
how much each and every player can be paid. It was first introduced into the 
English Football League in 1901 by the Football Association (FA), with the 
maximum being set at four pounds. Such a wage restriction was unique in the 
history of industrial employment and was retained for 60 years, by which time 
the maximum wage was £20 a week, the minimum eight.25 These figures, it is 
suggested, also indicate that the maximum wage was used in English soccer, 
and elsewhere, to keep a control on what a star player could earn. 
The problem with a maximum wage therefore, especially when the 
difference between the maximum and the minimum was relatively small, was 
how to construct a club wage structure which could adequately reward the star 
players on the team. Given such problems it is not surprising that many clubs 
offered under-the-table payments to players. Five Sunderland players, for 
instance, were suspended during the 1956-57 season for their involvement in 
this illegal activity that had, by this time, become fairly widespread.26 
The threat of strike action by the Professional Players Association forced 
the league to abolish the maximum wage in 1961,27 It continued, however, in 
the Northern Irish Football League until it was challenged in the courts. In 
JohnstRn v Clifton ville Football and Athletic Club Ltd28 (Cliftonville) the 
plaintiii' was a part-time soccer player who, when he signed with Cliftonville, 
received a signing-on fee higher than that allowed under the league's 
regulations. The plaintiff then commenced legal action to have these 
regulations declared an unreasonable restraint of trade. Murray J noted that, 
based on the Nordemfelt test, two questions needed to be addressed:29 
(1) Did the maximum wage regulation constitute a restraint of trade in 
regard to the liberty of the plaintiff to obtain employment as a 
professional player? 
(2) If yes, is that restraint reasonable and therefore enforceable? 
Murray J noted that the maximum wage regulation did not restrict the 
plaintiff from signing with any of the 14 teams in the competition; it only 
restricted his freedom to negotiate the financial terms on which he was to play. 
24 Buti, above, n 3 at 143. 
25 B Dabscheck, 'Defensive Manchester: A History of the Professional Footballer's 
Association' in R Cashman and M McKernan, Sport in History: The Making of Modern 
Sporting History, University of Queensland Press, Brisbane, 1979, pp 251-2. 
26 Dabscheck, above, n 25 at 249. 
27 Dabscheck, above, n 25 at 249. 
28 [1984) NI 9. 
29 [1984] NI 9 at 18. 
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However, his Honour further noted that a contract in restraint of trade includes 
restricting the arrangements he (or she) may make with others, which if 
unreasonable, will be invalid.30 In his Honour's opinion a maximum wage 
undoubtedly interfered with the plaintiffs liberty of action in trading, and his 
liberty to negotiate the basic matter of payment he was to receive for his 
service to his employer, and so the regulation was therefore a restraint of 
trade. 31 Since the defendant's argument that the regulation prevented the 
stronger clubs from capturing all the best players was a 'bad point'32 his 
Honour held that the regulation was not reasonable and was therefore void. 33 
In Australia similar maximum wages were implemented in competitions 
like the Victorian Football League (VFL), the forerunner of the present-day 
AFL, at a time when players had full-time jobs and did little more than a 
couple of nights' training in preparation for a Saturday afternoon match. The 
system was scrapped without the matter being challenged in the courts,34 just 
as it had been in English soccer. The NSWRL, the forerunner of the 
present-day NRL, also introduced a maximum signing on fee and match 
payments in the quest of promoting or encouraging an even competition. 
However, as Wilcox J noted in Adamson, the regulation failed because of the 
inability of the league to effectively enforce it since associates of the club, 
rather than the clubs themselves, made extra payments to the players.35 
The maximum wage restraint has therefore been abandoned by a number of 
leagues and, in the instance when it was challenged in court, was held to be 
an unreasonable restraint of trade. This then raised the question as to whether 
the maximum wage, in the age of full-time professionalism and good 
television revenue, could still represent a reasonable restraint of trade. One 
league that presently implements a maximum wage restraint is the Women's 
National Basketball Association (WNBA) which has a maximum wage of 
$120,000 for anyone player.36 It should be noted, however, that this is, 
relatively speaking, a small league with more limited financial resources than 
othelJ:sporting leagues in the United States (US), or elsewhere in the world. 
Cricket Australia, meanwhile, while not having a maximum wage as such, 
does rank its 25 contracted players from 1 to 25, then pays them on a 
decreasing scale based on those rankings. Australian captain, Ricky Ponting, 
for instance, is currently the number one ranked player and is accordingly paid 
the highest retainer of around $600,000, in addition to his match payments.37 
The lowest ranked of the contracted players receives a base retainer of 
$125,000 while 100 or so state players are contracted to receive a base retainer 
of $32,500.38 It is suggested therefore that there is an element of a maximum 
wage restraint in the wage structure implemented by Cricket Australia. 
30 [1984] NI 9 at 19. 
31 [1984] NI 9 at 20-1. 
32 [1984] NI 9 at 21. 
33 [1984] NI 9 at 23. 
34 B Dabscheck, 'Industrial Relations and Professional Team Sports in Australia' (1976) 18 
Journal of Industrial Relations 28 at 32. 
35 (1991) 31 FCR 242 at 255. 
36 P Kogey, 'Jackson deal puts her top of the hoop', The Australian, 24 January 2005 at 23. 
37 Note that Cricket Australia also limits the overall payments to the players to 25 per cent of 
player-generated income which in effect acts like a salary cap. 
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Despite the decision in Clifton ville, there would appear to be an argument 
that, in some situations, a maximum wage set at a reasonably high level could 
be considered to be a reasonable restraint of trade. It is suggested it would 
more likely be in a relatively small league, like the WNBA, without too many 
star players. In competitions with numerous star players, however, for a 
maximum wage to be reasonable it would need to be able to cater for the stars, 
by providing, as in the Cricket Australia model, an opportunity for these star 
players to earn considerably more than the average player. At the time that the 
maximum wage was abandoned in English soccer, for instance, the best 
players could only legally earn two and half times that of the average pIa: ers. 
By comparison the top players in both the AFL and NRL earn around 20 times 
more than what the average players earn. This, it is suggested, is one reason 
why the AFL and the NRL, like most sports that presently seek to control 
player payments, do so by means of a salary cap rather than a maximum wage 
restraint. This then raises the question as to whether a salary cap represents a 
reasonable restraint of trade. 
Salary Caps 
Salary caps involve restricting player payments, not by limiting the amounts 
that can be paid to an individual player, but by limiting the overall amount that 
each club can spend on player payments, with the clubs then being left to 
decide how much to pay each individual player. Its aims can be summarised 
by a NSWRL discussion paper on salary caps, narn.~l~f t~at: 
(1) To ensure individual clubs remain solvent there must be a limit on the 
payment to the players. 
(2) To ensure a successful and financially viable league, there needs to be 
an even competition to enhance spectator appeaJ.39 
A§alary cap can come in one of two forms: an even salary where the same 
limir applies to each club, and an uneven salary cap where a different amount 
exists for each club, depending on the governing body's view of the club's 
specific financial situation.40 It is suggested that an uneven salary cap is less 
likely to represent a reasonable restraint of trade as it is less likely an even 
competition will be created if some clubs are permitted to spend considerably 
more on player salaries than other clubs, an opinion also expressed by Buti.41 
Buti also points out that salary caps, unlike other labour controls, have 
remained free from legal challenge,42 though it should be noted that NRL 
player, Brett Kimmorley, did threaten legal action over the NRL salary cap 
when such restrictions prevented him from signing with the St 
George-Illawarra club.43 However, at present, the only judicial reference to 
salary caps in Australia are some obiter statements in Adamson.44 
In the original trial Hill J acknowledged that while the salary cap introduced 
39 Buti, above, n 3 at 142. 
40 Buti, above, n 3 at 146. 
41 Buti, above, n 3 at 146. 
42 Buti, above, n 3 at 132. 
43 S Honeysett, 'Sharks to seize Kimmorley', The Australian, 6 November 2001 at 17. 
44 For a greater discussion on the two Adamson cases in regard to the salary cap see Buti, 
above, n 3 at 136-140. 
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by the NSWRL in 1990 was not the subject of a challenge by the players, it 
still formed an important part of the competition rules.45 His Honour also 
stated that the internal draft may be justified by the objective of financial 
stability in the situation that then prevailed in the NSWRL where an uneven 
salary cap was in use because some clubs were less viable than others. 
However, his Honour also stated that 'with greater financial equality of clubs 
and an equal salary cap (both objectives of the League) the result may well be 
different' .46 
Buti has suggested that these comments may indicate an acceptance of 
salary caps,47 but points to other comments by Hill J about clubs not being 
sufficiently viable financially to spend up to their salary caps, as indicating that 
sports administrators may have some difficulty in justifying a salary cap 
system.48 Buti also expresses the view that Wilcox 1's judgment in the Full 
Court of the Federal Court could give encouragement to any potential 
complainant against a salary cap system. He points to references that without 
a salary cap clubs would have greater freedom to purchase necessary players 
and this therefore ought to improve, rather than detract from, the overall 
competitiveness of the competition.49 However, as Sheppard J pointed out, the 
validity of the salary cap was not an issue in the case,50 and so therefore the 
question as to whether salary caps in Australia are valid remains an open one. 
Salary Caps and the Restraint of Trade Doctrine 
While salary caps have not yet been the subject of litigation, as Buti 
suggests,5J if the salary cap fails to satisfy the Lord Macnaghten test in 
Nordenfelt, the salary cap would appear to be subject to legal challenge. It is 
also suggested that what needs to be addressed when looking at the validity of 
the salary cap and the potential legal problems associated with its use are the 
following: 
(1) whether it is an even or uneven salary cap because, as mentioned, the 
latter is less likely to be considered a reasonable restraint of trade; 
(2) whether it interferes with a player's choice of employer; 
(3) whether it involves players being deliberately underpaid; 
(4) the problems enforcing the salary cap;52 
(5) whether there is empirical evidence to support that salary caps 
produce sporting equality, and that, in turn, this creates a financially 
more viable competition. 53 
These points will be discussed in relation to the salary caps implemented by 
both the NRL and AFL. The salary cap system will then be analysed in 
relation to the Nordenfelt test, that is, is it reasonably necessary in order to 
45 (1990) 27 FeR 535 at 543. 
46 (1990) 27 FeR 535 at 565-6. 
47 Buti, above, n 3 at 137. 
48 Buti, above, n 3 at 138. 
49 Buti, above, n 3 at 139. 
50 (1991) 31 FeR 242 at 249. 
51 Buti, above, n 3 at 141. 
52 Buti, above, n 3 at 149. 
53 Buti, above, n 3 at 144-5. 
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protect the interests of the leagues and the clubs, is it not unreasonable in 
regard to the players, and not injurious to the public. 
Issues Relating to the Use of a Salary Cap System 
Even or Uneven Salary Cap 
The NSWRL implemented a salary cap for its 1990 season. It was an uneven 
salary cap in that different clubs had differing amounts, the highest amount 
being $1,500,000, the lowest $800,000, with the amount being determined by 
the league's analysis of each club's financial situation. A similar inequality 
operated for the 1991 season, though the ultimate intention was to set a 
uniform ceiling for each club.54 While the salary cap was dropped during the 
Super League war of the mid 1990s, it was re-introduced into the NRL 
competition for the 2000 season, this time with an even system with each of 
the 15 clubs having a limit of $3.39m for the 2007 season, rising to $4.lm by 
the 2010 season. 
The AFL's salary cap will be $6.94m for each club for the 2007 season, 
significantly higher than the NRL salary cap, and will also increase by at least 
3 per cent per annum over the next four years.55 Unlike the NRL, each club 
is required to spend at least 92.5 per cent of that amount.56 The National 
Football League (NFL), it should be noted, also employs a similar minimum 
level, in its case A$111 m, as well as a maximum of A$131 m. 57 In the AFL 
players over the age of 30 who have played for 10 seasons with that club can 
also be placed on a 'veterans list' with only part of their salaries being counted 
in the salary cap. If there are two such players, then half of their salary counts. 
If there are three, then a third of each player's salary will not count towards 
the salary cap. 
Until recently Brisbane and Sydney had an extra 10 per cent and 15 per cent 
respecfIveiy to compensate for the fact that they both have more out of state 
players than the other teams and, in the case of Sydney, a higher cost of living. 
These extra allowances to Brisbane and Sydney were the subject of strong 
criticism from some of the Melbourne clubs, particularly after Brisbane won 
three successive Premierships from 2001 to 2003, the claim being that the 
inequality it created placed the Victorian clubs at a disadvantage.58 This 
resulted in the AFL significantly reducing these concessions. Brisbane had its 
extra amount cut to 9 per cent in 2004 and then to 7.5 per cent in 2005. 
Sydney's was reduced by 1 per cent per year for two years, and in 2006 both 
clubs will revert to a formula which will give every club an extra $30,000 for 
up to 12 interstate players, though it will only apply to clubs where less than 
40 per cent of their playing list are homegrown.59 Under the new scheme 
54 (1991) 31 FCR 242 at 256. 
55 G Denham, 'Players gain $9m pay hike', The Australian, Friday, 13 June 2003 at 27. 
56 'Strength in new pay deal', AFL Record, 4 August 2006 at 16. For the 2008 season the salary 
cap will be $7.43m, then $7.70m in 2009, $7.96m in 2010, and $8.22m in 2011. 
57 'Tough on dirty dogs in US', The Sunday Mail, 25 August 2002 at 148. 
58 C Le Grand, 'Collingwood declare salary cap war', The Australian, 30 September 2002 at 
18, C Saltau, 'Malthouse proposes mid season trade', The Age, 31 October 2002 at Sport 3. 
59 G Denham, C Le Grand, 'Brisbane pay the price of success', The Australian, 1 July 2003 at 
16. 
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Sydney will, however, retain a housing allowance of 7 per cent.60 
Thus, within the question of a salary cap being an even or uneven one, the 
AFL salary cap has a number of factors presently not found in the NRL's 
salary cap. These are a minimum level of 92.5 per cent, potential extra 
concessions for any club with less than 40 per cent of homegrown talent, a 7 
per cent housing allowance for Sydney, and the presence of a 'veterans list' 
where only part of those players' salary will be included in the club's salary 
cap. In the author's opinion this veterans list works well as a system that helps 
to reward players who have shown loyalty to a particular club and, as it 
applies equally to all clubs, does not really have an impact on the evenness or 
unevenness of the salary cap. The lower level of the AFL's salary cap, together 
with the extra allowances that are available, however, raises the question of 
whether the AFL salary cap is in fact an uneven one. 
The author would argue that the standard 7.5 per cent difference between 
the maximum and minimum levels in the AFL represents a reasonable 
difference, particularly when compared to the much greater difference that 
existed in the previous NSWRL salary cap. The author would also express the 
opinion that this system of maximum and a minimum levels of the salary cap 
works well, the former providing good protection for the clubs, the latter 
giving protection to the players. It is further suggested that there is 
justification for the extra allowances that are allowed as it can be harder for 
clubs to retain interstate players whenever their contracts expire, as all things 
being equal, there is a strong possibility these players may choose to return 
home. However, the author does agree with the new way of calculating these 
figures, as it is now done in a non-discriminatory way, where all other clubs 
are eligible should they meet the criteria. 
There is also little doubt that Sydney is the most expensive city in Australia 
in which to live, and this, it is suggested, is also justification for the extra 7 per 
cent housing allowance that Sydney is still allowed. However, this again could 
be calculated in a non-discriminatory way by relating it to a percentage above 
me average cost of living in Australia, thus making every club potentially 
eligible should the cost of living rise significantly in the city in which they are 
based. 
In summary, it is the author's opinion that the salary cap utilised by the AFL 
can be considered an even, and therefore more likely to be a reasonable, one 
with the in-built discrepancies justified by either the need to balance other 
inequalities within a national competition, or as a logical way to allow less 
wealthy clubs to remain reasonably competitive. 
Players Forced to Take Pay Cuts 
While Sydney could, until recently, have its players' salaries reaching 115 per 
cent of the salary cap, it should be noted that in recent years it has only been 
using 103 per cent.6J This is due to financial problems which have forced the 
club to cut costs, including payments to players in 2003. Despite such 
measures it looked likely that the club would require financial assistance from 
60 G Denham, C Le Grand, above, n 59. 
61 C Le Grand, 'Pay cuts continue as clubs enter red', The Australian, 14 November 2002 at 
16. 
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the AFL in order to help compensate for the loss from, amongst other things, 
the impact of the 2003 Rugby Union World CUp.62 However, better than 
expected on-field performances in 2003 and subsequent years, including the 
2005 Premiership, provided sufficient revenue for the club to operate without 
a grant from the AFL.63 
The Western Bulldogs on the other hand had to apply to the AFL for a 
$1 million assistance package in order to keep trading. Part of the AFL's 
requirement for the granting of such assistance was an undertaking by the 
Western Bulldogs that it limit future player payments to around 92.5 per cent 
of the salary cap. Following a meeting between Western Bulldogs and AFL 
officials the players agreed to take pay-cuts that would lower the club's total 
player payments to about 94 per cent of this year's cap in order to guarantee 
the AFL line of credit. Captain Chris Grant described it as a salary sacrifice, 
with the alternative being the loss of several uncontracted players from the 
club's playing list.64 
While players from the Western Bulldogs and Sydney have had to take pay 
cuts to help the clubs avoid financial problems, salary cap pressures have 
forced players to take pay cuts even at financially stable clubs, such as 
Essendon. 
At the end of the 1999 season Essendon was unable to reach a contractual 
arrangement with Justin Blumfield because of salary cap restrictions. 
Blumfield was all but ready to sign with Sydney as it was both willing and 
able to pay what he was asking for. Only a discussion with coach Kevin 
Sheedy just before the 1999 National Draft persuaded Blumfield to sign for 
less money. Another Essendon player, Joe Misiti, likewise was offered less 
money than he was seeking during negotiations to renew his contract at the 
end of the 2001 season. Despite strong interest from Collingwood, he too 
decided to stay at Essendon, reportedly for $300,000, rather than the $325,000 
he was asking for. At the same time a number of Richmond players also 
accepted less money in order to stay at the club, with Wayne Campbell and 
Duncan Kellaway reportedly accepting a combined reduction of $350,000, 
while Joel Bowden, Andrew Kellaway, Greg Tivendale, Matthew Rogers, 
Mark Chaffey and Craig Biddiscombe all reportedly accepted cuts of 
$25,000.65 The end of the 2002 season saw a number of Brisbane players take 
voluntary pay cuts in order to help the club retain its premiership winning 
playing list, with 12 senior players taking a collective cut of $380,000.66 A 
number of Melbourne and Essendon players, including captain James Hird, 
also reportedly took pay cuts that year,67 while in 2005 a number of St Kilda 
players reportedly re-signed for much less than they were being offered by 
other c1ubs.68 
62 G Denham, 'Dire Swans need $2m handout', The Australian, 3 June 2003 at 18. 
63 G Denham, 1 McAsey and P Lalor, 'Swans' success boosts finances', The Australian, 10 
September 2003 at 18. 
64 C Le Grand, above, n 61. 
65 C Wilson, 'Top Tigers' pay slash', The Age, 12 October 200 I at Sport I. 
66 M Davis, 'Matthews accuses clubs of dishonesty in trading period', The Australian, 
November 2002 at 35. 
67 J Niall, 'Complications of switching sides in draft bidding war', The Age, 29 October 2002. 
68 G Denham, 'Saints to stick together in quest for greatness', The Australian, II March 2005. 
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Thus salary caps can clearly create situations whereby players are forced to 
take cuts in their pay, and Buti suggests that one argument against the validity 
of a salary cap system is that it requires players to accept less money and 
therefore involves employers deliberately underpaying its employees.69 
Players Being Unable to Choose Their Employer 
When Brett Kimmorley left NRL club, the Northern Eagles, after it was 
unable to fulfil its contractual commitments, he indicated he wished to join St 
George-Illawarra. The club indicated it was willing to sign Kimmorley for the 
same amount he had been contracted for at the Northern Eagles, but was 
unable to do so because of its salary cap restrictions. KimmorIey then 
threatened legal action, though that was eventually dropped after he signed 
with Cronulla, reportedly on much less money than he had been earning at the 
Northern Eagles and what he could have earned at St George-Illawarra.7o 
The situation, therefore, involved not only a player having to reduce his 
income, but also having to choose another employer, two potential legal 
arguments against the salary cap representing a reasonable restraint of trade. 
The fact that Kimmorley was the victim of being contracted with a club that 
was unable to fulfil its financial commitments suggests that, given the 
circumstances, the NRL perhaps should have been willing to grant another 
club dispensation from the salary cap so that the player was not disadvantaged 
financially. While the author's opinion is that you either have a rigidly 
enforced salary cap, or none at all, the one exemption may be the KimmorIey 
situation where one club is unable to meet its financial commitments to the 
player. A case-by-case dispensation to cover such situations may therefore be 
a fair solution. 
What can complicate salary cap questions in the AFL is that it also employs 
a draft system, meaning that players can only change clubs by being traded or 
deli~ted. The salary cap can force clubs to trade players in order to reduce the 
sal<ify cap pressures, and this was never so apparent than at the end of the 2002 
season and, as Niall points out,71 the names of those traded was staggering, 
with many of the trades being caused by salary cap pressures. Essendon was 
the hardest hit, losing three premiership players in Blake Caracella, Justin 
Blumfield and Chris Heffernan to Brisbane, Richmond and Melbourne 
respectively. As head coach, Kevin Sheedy, pointed out the club did not want 
to lose the players and none of the three players wanted to go but were 
required to go because of what assistant coach, Robert Shaw, described as a 
prohibitive salary capJ2 Comments such as these clearly illustrate that the 
salary cap can certainly prevent players from choosing their employer. 
Salary cap pressure was also a big factor behind the Kangaroos trading 
Byron Pickett to Port Adelaide, while perhaps the highest profile 
69 Buti, above, n 3 at 153. 
70 Honeysett, above, n 21. 
71 J Niall, 'Complications of switching sides in draft bidding war', The Age, 29 October 2002 
at Sport 3. 
72 K Lyon and N Ahmed, 'Bombers on defensive over departures', The Age, 4 October 2002 
at Sports 3. Note that Heffernan later returned to Essendon by means of the 2005 pre-season 
draft: P Krupka, 'Camporeale dons the red and black' The Australian, 14 December 2005 at 
18. 
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salary-related trade was that of Melbourne's 200] Brownlow Medallist, Shane 
Woewodin to Collingwood, with Woewodin only hearing of the deal while on 
holiday in Mauritius.73 While the trade may have been a shock, it was 
essentially a result of Woewodin's relatively poor season in 2002 where he 
went from being voted the best player in the competition in 2001 to being 
considered no better than twelfth best at his club the following year. On a 
salary of $500 000 a year, Woewodin had simply not performed to a level that 
his large salary required. As Niall points out, the deal, from Melbourne's 
perspective, was far from catastrophic as it enabled the club to fit under the 
salary cap, sign other players and have room to manouevre for the 2003 
season.74 From Woewodin's perspective it was also hardly disastrous as he 
was traded to the 2002 Grand Finalists which, unlike Melbourne, went on to 
play in the 2003 finals. 
However, from the collective players' perspective, one of the problems with 
the abovementioned cases was the way in which it was done, with the 
Australian Football League Players' Association (AFLPA) Chief Executive, 
Rob Kerr, stating that a lot of the tactics employed in the 2002 trading period 
left the players feeling bitter. The AFLPA sought to limit this trading to players 
v.ilo were out of contract when it was re-negotiating the collective bargaining 
agreement, but had to accept a compromise where players on contracts of 
greater than three years will not be traded in the first vear.75 
Enforcing the Salary Cap 
News broke in August 2002 that NRL club, the Canterbury Bulldogs, were 
involved in large-scale abuse of the salary cap system. Extra payments had 
been made by the Canterbury Leagues Club which then took many of the 
players' salaries to a level that meant the salary cap had been well and truly 
breached.76 
The situation graphically illustrates the point that salary caps can be hard to 
enforce, and also concurs with Wilcox 1's comments in Adamsonin regard to 
maximum wages, that extra payments can come from associates of the club, 
rather thall the club itselfJ7 It is also worth noting that the breach was 
detected from a source other than the NRL, namely newspaper journalists. 
While this can be used to support the argument that breaches can be hard to 
detect by the controlling body, the author suggests the case indicates that there 
a number of sources that can detect the breaches, and that it does not really 
matter who actually detects the breach, as long as it is detected. 
What was more important was the response of the NRL to immediately 
penalise Canterbury by removing all the competition points it had earned 
73 C Saltau, 'Woewodin shows off his new colours', The Age, 31 October 2002 at Sport 3. Note 
that Woewodin was delisted by Collingwood after the 2005 season and after not securing a 
contract with any other club, is no longer playing in the AFL. See P Krupka, above, n 77, 
at 18. 
74 J Niall, 'Complications of switching sides in a draft bidding war', The Age, 29 October 2002 
at Sport 3. 
75 G Denham, above, n 34. For further discussion see Salary Cap and [he Interests of [he 
Players in this paper. 
76 S Honeysett and I Pay ten, 'Capital Punishment', The Aus[ralian, 26 August 2002 at 17. 
77 (1991) 31 FCR 242 at 255. 
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while operating in breach of the salary cap restrictions, as well as imposing a 
$500,000 fine.7 8 This, it is suggested, not only provided the appropriate 
penalty, but will also act as a severe deterrent to any other club that may have 
similar ideas of deliberately and systematically breaching the salary cap. 
Like the NRL, the AFL has also encountered breaches of the salary cap. 
Prior to 2002 Carlton, Melbourne, Essendon and Fremantle were all found to 
have breached the salary cap after independent audits were carried out on the 
clubs. Fines were imposed on the clubs, with Melbourne, Essendon and 
Fremantle also losing draft choices for these breaches. 
A more extensive breach of the salary cap was brought to light at the end 
of the 2002 season when news broke of the investigation into salary cap 
breaches by Carlton involving extra payments to leading players Fraser 
Brown, Stephen O'Reilly, Craig Bradley and Stephen Silvagni. Carlton's 
plight was made worse by the fact that it still had a suspended sentence on a 
$57,000 fine and the loss of a second and third round draft choice from a 
previous breach in 1998.79 
The willingness of the AFL, like the NRL, to enforce meaningful penalties, 
it is suggested, is the most important outcome from these severe breaches. 
Fines are never sufficient, as the richer clubs may well be prepared to pay even 
a hefty fine in return for a premiership, particularly as a premiership win will 
usually produce greater income.so The loss of competition points or draft 
selections on the other hand will have a real impact on the ability of any club 
to win present and future premierships. This can be seen by the dramatic fall 
of Carlton who have finished in the bottom two for three of the past four years, 
including its first ever wooden spoon in 2002, with the club again finishing 
last in 2005 and 2006. Like the NRL, the AFL has now indicated that it is 
prepared to deduct competition points as well as imposing fines and taking 
awax draft choices, with this move receiving the support of the clubs.sl 
THus, while the author agrees with Buti that one of the arguments against 
the implementation of a salary cap system is the difficulty of enforcing it, 
recent events indicate that, first, they have been detected and, second, the 
penalties imposed by the governing bodies have, and will continue to act, as 
a deterrent against future breaches. It is suggested that proof of the impact lies 
in the fact that AFL clubs are now willing to trade even their best players, 
rather than risk breaching the salary cap, and suffer the consequences of the 
imposition of harsh penalties. 
78 A Hawse, 'Gallop's warning: rort the cap and you will lose titles', The Sunday Mail, 25 
August 2002 at 150. 
79 C Le Grand, 'Cap breaches cloud Blues' draft choices', The Australian, 12 November 2002 
at 14. It should be noted too that this breach was discovered by accident when Fraser Brown 
made a claim for long service leave payments. It then became clear that he had received a 
much higher salary than that indicated on the official contract lodged with the AFL: see R 
Gluyas, ') guess that is why they call it the Blues', The Weekend Australian, 30 November 
2002 at 50. 
80 This was mentioned by former executive commissioner of the AFL, Alan Schwab, when 
giving evidence in Adamson v New South Wales Rugby League Ltd (1991) 31 FCR 242 at 
256-7. 
81 M Davis, 'Clubs accept point penalties for salary cheats', The Australian, 21 March 2003 at 
34. 
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Protecting the Interests of the League and the Clubs 
As previously mentioned, the restraint of trade doctrine places the onus on the 
party imposing the restriction to show that it is no more than what is necessary 
to protect their interests. Professional team sports have a tendency to be highly 
regulated and cooperative organisations with restrictive labour market 
controls because the attractiveness of competition depends on a high degree of 
uncertainty about the result of any competition, and so the measures are seen 
as reducing the chances of a few teams dominating the competition through 
their economic power. This therefore raises the question as to whether the 
salary cap used by the NRL and AFL has helped to create a more even 
competition. 
Does a Salary Cap Create a More Even Competition? 
The first problem with looking at this issue is whether the evenness of a 
competition can actually be measured. Buti cites the evidence from the 
VFL/AFL that in the period from 1984 to 1997 only seven clubs won the 
premiership compared to four in the 11 years prior to the introduction of the 
salary cap, to support a claim that the salary cap has not created a more even 
competition.82 The author, however, would argue that these figures indicate 
that the AFL is a more even competition, and would further note that in the 
1990s seven clubs won the premiership compared to a combined total of five 
clubs during the 1970s and 1980s; every club made the finals at least once in 
the 1990s, except for Fremantle who only joined the competition in 1995; and 
in the 1990s most of the teams achieved, or went close to what the author 
describes as their 'finals quota'. 83 
Le Gr~nd,84 meanwhile, makes the point that the overwhelming anecdotal 
evidenc~ from the 2003 season was that the difference between the best and 
worst teams in the competition has never been smaller. Essendon coach, Kevin 
Sheedy, Sydney coach, Paul Roos, and the Western Bulldogs' coach, Rodney 
Eade, have all made comments in the media about how even the AFL 
competition now is.85 In regard to the NRL, CEO David Gallop has recently 
cited the increase in crowd numbers and sponsorships as being evidence that 
the salary cap was responsible for making the 2005 season the most successful 
competition ever.86 Thus, even if acceptable empirical data cannot be 
obtained, the anecdotal evidence from those within the industry does indicate 
an acceptance that the labour market controls, such as the salary cap, have 
achieved the stated objective of creating a more even competition. 
82 Buti, above, n 3 at 145. 
83 The finals quota involves looking at the number of times a club made the finals in a given 
decade in relation to the percentage of teams that make the final each year. For example, in 
the AFL eight teams out of sixteen (50 per cent) now make the finals each year. This means 
that the finals quota is now 50 per cent, that is, in a perfectly even competition each team 
would be expected to make the finals 50 per cent of the time which is five times per decade. 
84 C Le Grand, 'Interstate clubs hold all the vital aces', The Australian,S June 2003 at 16. 
85 J Halloran, 'Hayes enjoying club culture', The Australian, II July 2003 at 38. P Krupta, 
'Draft, cap take hold', The Australian, 29 April 2005 at 29. 
86 B Read, 'League tips cap to success', The Australian, I September 2005. 
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Other Interests of the League 
The salary cap is also being used by the AFL to have some control over how 
certain clubs are run. The AFL, for instance, has forced the Western Bulldogs 
to use the minimum level of the salary cap as a condition of the financial 
assistance it is giving the club. As to why the AFL would help such a club to 
keep trading can be seen by looking at its $780 million television contract 
which requires the AFL to provide eight games per week until 2011. More 
critical to this figure is the involvement of Sydney, as it is acknowledged that 
its presence in the competition added $100 million to any television deal, 
which is why, when it had financial concerns in 2003, approval for any 
required assistance was immediately given. 
The AFL, and all its constituent clubs, therefore needs the Western Bulldogs 
and Sydney in order to fulfil its requirements under the contract, and so 
receive the lucrative money on offer. A salary cap therefore arguably helps to 
provide financial stability so that a league such as the AFL can guarantee a 
given number of games for the duration of a long-term television deal. It 
should be noted that since the imposition of the salary cap in the then VFL no 
team has folded, though one club, Fitzroy, did merge with Brisbane to form 
the Brisbane Lions. Rugby league, on the other hand, since the unrestrained 
payments to players instigated by the Super League war, has seen eight teams 
fold,87 some of which could not fully pay all their players and could not 
honour the later years of the players' contracts, as the Brett Kimmorley 
situation indicates. The author would therefore suggest that not only has the 
AFL salary cap helped to create a more even competition, it has also helped 
to create a more financially stable competition. It does mean that some 
financially well off clubs are restricted in how much they pay their players, 
and that the AFL has to provide financial assistance to some clubs. However, 
it is suggested that these are simply examples of what is required under the 
mutual interdependence that is the hallmark of the unique economic structure 
of sporting leagues. 
Thus, it can be argued that the salary cap does pass the Nordenfelt test in 
regard to the interests of the league. The salary cap sets a maximum amount 
to the money that must be found to pay the players, and this, it is suggested, 
is clearly in the interests of the clubs. The fact that clubs in both the AFL and 
NRL have supported the heavy penalties imposed by their respective 
governing bodies for breaches of the salary cap also indicates that the clubs 
believe that the salary caps are in their best interests. 
Salary Caps and the Interests of the Players 
The previously mentioned examples of players having to accept pay cuts to 
stay at the clubs of their choice and others having to be delisted to allow their 
87 The Hunter Mariners, Perth Reds, Adelaide Rams, Gold Coast Chargers, South East 
Crushers were all teams that folded during the merger between Super League and the 
Australian Rugby League (ARL) run competition. Since the merger both the Northern 
Eagles and the Auckland Warriors have gone out of business, though they are still in the 
competition as Manly and the New Zealand Warriors respectively. North Sydney did merge 
with Manly to form the Northern Eagles, but are now not represented in the competition in 
any form. 
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clubs to remain under the salary cap show that, prima facie, salary caps are 
clearly against the best interests of individual players. 
Buti88 suggests that cases such as these where players have either needed to 
accept less money than they believe they are worth, or worse, having to accept 
pay cuts on contracts they have already signed, indicates that the salary cap 
represents an unreasonable restraint of trade. The author, however, would 
argue that it is reasonable as long as the amount of money the players had to 
relinquish is a reasonable amount, and that the salary cap protects the 
legitimate and protectable interests of the AFL. It should be noted that the 
majority of the previously mentioned examples involved less than a 10 per 
cent cut in wages and it is suggested that this is a reasonable amount, given 
that out-of-contract players had the opportunity to receive the remuneration 
they felt they deserved by moving to another club. If it is a player still under 
contract that is asked to take a pay cut, then this will represent a breach of 
contract, leaving the player free to find another club which still has room 
under its salary cap.89 It should also be noted that not all of the situations 
involved actual pay cuts as such, just the difference between the amount the 
club could afford to pay under the restraints of the salary cap and the figure the 
player valued his services at when negotiating a new contract. Also of note is 
that some of these players took pay cuts to stay at a club which, in their 
opinion, offered them the best chance of on-field success, as for many players 
this can be more important than money.90 Finally, the author would also point 
out that the number of players involved has been relatively small. 
Players being delisted, however, is another question. It is suggested that the 
types of delisting brought about by Essendon's salary cap problems should 
decrease in the coming years simply because the clubs will become better at 
handling the salary cap, as even though it has been in operation since 1984 it 
has arguably only been rigidly enforced in the last five years or so. 
Ttk type of situation involving Shane Woewodin will, however, most likely 
occur again. This is because it will continue to be a part of football life that 
players placed on lucrative contracts with long-term security will need to 
continue to perform at a level that justifies the large percentage of a club's 
salary cap that their salary takes up. Certainly there is a strong argument that 
the players need to be better informed of a club's intention and the author 
88 Buti, above, n 3 at 153. 
89 One of the outcomes of the Carlton salary cap breaches was that the club was also going to 
be in breach for the 2003 season and therefore had to negotiate pay cuts from the players. 
All the players eventually agreed to the request though there was talk of some players 
refusing and seeking a release from their contracts. See G Denham, 'Blues pass cap around 
to stars', The Australian, 26 November 2002 at 16; M Davis, 'Players may kill cap, draft', 
The Australian, 28 November 2002 at 16. As the Breit Kimmorley situation indicates there 
is still the problem that while a club may be willing to sign a player who has left by means 
of a release from their contract, they may not be able to do so because it has no room under 
the salary cap. As mentioned, one suggested solution is that such players are then exempted 
from the salary cap so that another club can sign them. See J Dunne, 'Day in court for salary 
cap', The Australian, 19 October 2001 at 36. 
90 See C Stewart, 'King of the Beasts', The Weekend Australian Magazine, 29-30 March 2003 
at 16 regarding comments that the Brisbane players were willing to make some financial 
sacrifice in the quest for what money cannot always replace, namely on-field success. See 
also B McDonald, above, n 2, at Sport 3 and G Denham, above, n 2 at 27. 
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suggests that the implementation of a consent clause before any player can be 
traded would help in this regard. It is worth noting that one of the features of 
the new rules governing soccer that were implemented after the decision in 
ASBL v Bosman91 is that contracted players must give their consent before 
they are the subject of any possible transfer deal.92 The fact that Shane 
Woewodin's trade was conducted while he was on holidays indicates that this 
consent was very much lacking. However, it should also be noted that as a 
contracted player, Woewodin had the right to hold Melbourne to that contract, 
and refuse to go to Collingwood. While no AFL player has, as yet, enforced 
this contractual right, English Premier League soccer players Mark Bosnich 
and Dwight Yorke refused to move on loan to Glasgow Celtic or to be 
transferred to Middlesborough respectively after Manchester United had 
negotiated deals with those clubs.93 Leeds' goalkeeper, Paul Robinson, 
likewise refused a move to Aston Villa even though Leeds had already agreed 
to the sale, and later moved to Tottenham.94 It has also been suggested that if 
Woewodin had refused to go to Collingwood, 'Melbourne would have 
welcomed him back with open arms'.95 
What benefits, if any, do the players obtain from being a part of a salary cap 
system? From the players' perspective one advantage of the salary cap, at least 
in comparison with the maximum wage restraint, is that star players can be 
paid a remuneration that is more reflective of their position within the game. 
Both the NRL and the recently formed A-League have recently introduced 
additions to their respective salary caps to assist this by allowing a few top 
players to earn money outside the salary cap. In the A-League each club is 
allowed one star 'marquee' player who is paid outside the salary cap96 while 
in the NRL two players from each club can earn extra money through 
sponsorship that is not counted in the salary cap.97 However, for all players, 
both star and average alike, the main benefit of the salary cap can be greater 
stability in employment. In the AFL this has come from the financial security 
that the AFL's long-term television deal has provided as this has enabled the 
AFL to support clubs that have required its assistance. Compare that to the 
NRL during the period when it did not operate a salary cap, as the television 
deal that it managed to negotiate, at $400 million for six years, was far less 
than that of the AFL, while some contracted players were not fully paid when 
91 Uniun Ruyale Beige des Sudetes de Fuutball Association (ASBL) v Bosman [1996] I CMLR 
645. 
92 For a discussion of these new regulations see C Davies, 'Post Bosman and the Future of 
Soccer is Contract Law', (2003) 19 JCL 190. 
93 Bosnich later transferred to Chelsea and Yorke later transferred to Blackburn Rovers, and is 
now playing for Sydney FC in the Australian A-League. 
94 'Barcelona to make their play for Viduka', The Australian, 30 June 2003 at 19. 
95 C Le Grand, 'Tricks of the trade have players looking for a fairer system', The Weekend 
Australian, 2-3 November 2002 at 9. It is also worth noting than in 1987 Gary Buckenara 
took his club Hawthorn to court in what turned out to be a failed attempt to return to Perth 
when the West Coast Eagles entered the competition. Once the court held him to his contract 
with Hawthorn he went on to playa starring role with the club the following season when 
he kicked a goal after the siren to enable Hawthorn to make the 1987 Grand Final. See 
Buckenara v Hawthorn Football Club [1988] VR 39. 
96 M Cockerill, 'Salary cap may put lid on Lowy's ambitious programme', The Sydney 
Murning Herald, 23 December 2004 at 32. 
97 S Honeysett, 'No limit to what the stars can earn', The Australian, 4 March 2005. 
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both the Northern Eagles and the Auckland Warriors went out of business. It 
is suggested, therefore, that in recent years players have accepted labour 
market controls because of the stability of employment that they have 
apparently provided. 
Thus, it is suggested, even when looking at the party most disadvantaged by 
the salary cap, namely the players, it can still be said that the salary cap, while 
representing a restraint of trade, is a reasonable one, as it operates in their 
long-term collective interests. 
Is the Salary Cap Injurious to the Public? 
The third, and final, component of the Nordenfelt test is whether the restraint 
acts against the interests of the public. Buti correctly points out that this factor 
of public interest has received less attention by the courts, as it is intimately 
connected with the determination of what is reasonable between the parties.98 
P !.lti also goes on to state that it is not in the public interest to have a 
competition where the weaker clubs are supported by a system that places a 
restraint on the payments to players and that this deliberately underpaying of 
professional athletes is not in the public interest.99 
So, what benefit does the public obtain from the implementation of a salary 
cap system? The author would argue that it is a more even, more interesting 
competition played by players who are both fitter and more skilful because 
they now have the means to train full time for football. For the supporters of 
the traditionally less successful AFL clubs it is also a more rewarding 
spectator experience as none of the AFL clubs are now experiencing long 
periods of time being uncompetitive even for a finals berth.loo In the AFL each 
club has managed to survive the change to full-time professionalism. All 
supporters, therefore, still have their original club to support, even if, in the 
case of South Melbourne and Fitzroy, it now means supporting a team based 
interstate. 
It should be remembered that it is ultimately spectator support, both 
television and at the gate, that creates the revenue sufficient enough to support 
a professional league. Thus the league, clubs and the players all have an 
interest in the salary cap not being injurious to the public, and the author 
would argue that there is no detriment to the public in limiting the payment to 
98 Buti, above, n 3 at 152. 
99 Buti, above, n 3 at 153. 
100 During the 1990s for instance all clubs, except Fremantle who only joined the competition 
in 1995, made the finals at least once. Compare this to what happened prior to the 
introduction of a salary cap and draft systems, when clubs often went a decade or more 
without making the finals, with Hawthorn holding the record of 32 years from 1925 to 1956. 
Other long periods without making the finals include 24 years by South Melbourne (now 
Sydney) from 1946-69, Melbourne 22 years from 1965-86 and St Kilda 21 years from 
1940-60. It is acknowledged that, percentage wise, more teams make the finals now than 
they did in some previous decades, but adjusting the figures to the present day 50 per cent 
of teams does little to change these figure. Hawthorn's record, for instance, would only be 
altered by a 5th place in 1943, and hence would still have had a period of 18 years without 
making the finals, one year in the finals, followed by another period of 13 years without 
making the finals. South Melbourne meanwhile would still have gone 17 years without 
making the finals. 
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players if it helps to create a more viable and competitive league that is in turn 
more interesting to follow. 
In the NRL there is the same argument that the recent re-introduction of the 
salary cap has created a more even, and more interesting competition to 
follow, as evidenced by the closely fought 2005 season. What could be 
considered injurious to the public, however, is the fact that some Australian 
rugby league players have been lost to both English rugby league and 
Australian rugby union, meaning that some of the better players, such as Lote 
Toquiri, Wendall Sailor and Mat Rogers, have been lost to the game. The 
author, however, would argue that it has been better for the spectators to have 
lost a few players than to lose clubs, which is what happened before the 
re-introduction of the salary cap. What should also be noted in regard to 
restrictions on the players is that this fact indicates that they have 
opportunities to ply their trade elsewhere, which would support a claim that it 
is not an unreasonable restraint of their trade. 
The Alternatives 
With the restraint of trade doctrine, not only must the party supporting the 
contract show that the restraint goes no further than what is necessary to 
protect the interest of the party which it favours, but they may need to show 
that there are no alternatives that are less restrictive. lo1 
One alternative to the present salary cap that has been suggested by both 
Buti 102 and ROSSlO3 is a reverse salary cap. This works by limiting only the top 
clubs to a salary cap so that players will be attracted to the less successful 
clubs. The author, however, sees a number of problems with such a system. 
First, as Buti acknowledges, it would probably be necessary for the relevant 
governing body to financially subsidise the less successful and poorer clubs in 
orqer for them to afford the higher salary cap system. 104 Although this could 
be\:Jone by using revenue, particularly from television rights, it is suggested 
that this is not an ideal system because it involves treating some clubs 
differently to others. 
The major practical problem would stem from the fact that, as Crockett J 
stated in Foschini v Victorian Football League and South Melbourne Football 
Club, relatively long-term contracts are a good way for a club to hold onto its 
players. 105 So if a club finishes at the bottom of the competition and it is 
granted a higher, league-backed salary cap which enables it to sign up some 
good players, the question then arises as to how long this increased salary cap 
should operate. If it is only for the following season then the bottom clubs may 
not be able to sign these new players for longer than one year because of the 
restrictions that will be placed on them by the salary cap. This, it is suggested, 
would totally defeat the purpose of the system. On the other hand, if it 
101 Buti, above, n 3 at 141. For case law see Mason v Provident Clothing and Supply Company 
Limited [1913J AC 724 at 733, Herbert Morris Limited v Saxelby [1916] AC 688 at 670. 
102 Buti, above, n 3 at 146. 
103 SF Ross, 'Anticompetitive aspects of sports' (1999) 7 Competition and Consumer Law 
Journal 125 at 127. 
104 Buti, above, n 3 at 147. 
105 Unreported, Victorian Supreme Court, 15 April 1983. 
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operated for a much longer time period so that these clubs were able to sign 
these players for four or five years, then they may well end up dominating the 
competition for this period of time. In the AFL, for instance, admittedly with 
a good draft system in place, teams like Melbourne and Brisbane have both 
gone from last place one year to a place in the Preliminary Final the following 
year. Hence under this proposed reverse salary cap system a combination of 
temporary coaching problems and major injury problems to a few key players 
could give a club a league-backed advantage that enables it to dominate the 
competition for a number of years. 
Conversely, if its salary cap was always linked to its position on the league 
ladder, that is, it decreased as it moved up the ladder, then the club would 
almost certainly face salary cap problems and as a result would most likely 
have to discard players. The only way around this would be to allow them to 
keep its higher salary cap and then continue to increase the salary cap for the 
following year's bottom club. This would obviously lead to a situation 
whereby the salary cap increases beyond inflation and most likely the means 
of the league. 106 It is for these reasons that the author believes that a reverse 
salary cap is, in reality, impractical. 
Another alternative is to not have a salary cap as such, but to restrict player 
payments to a percentage of what is known as player-generated income. 
Player-generated income is defined as the income obtained from broadcasting 
rights, match fees, gate takings, sponsorship and licensing/merchandising. lo7 
This is the system used by both the Australian Rugby Union (ARU) and 
Cricket Australia. The ARU's player payments are presently set at 30 per cent 
of player-generated income,108 while Cricket Australia's is 25 per cent of 
player-generated income. I09 The author suggests that could also be used in 
both the AFL and NRL to calculate the overall amount to be paid to the 
player§, with this amount then being divided by the number of teams in the 
competitions to arrive at the salary cap for each club. 
The final alternative involves the operation of a free market with no salary 
cap in operation. However, it should be noted that Justice Smellie in Rugby 
Union Players' Association v Commerce Commission I 10 accepted that leaving 
sporting organisations to the free market did not work as, in the long term, the 
better players will move to the stronger clubs. I II It is also suggested that the 
proponents of the operation of the free market in sporting competitions should 
106 Note that with a draft system, on the other hand, the bottom clubs are given an advantage at 
the end of the each season, but it is an advantage that decreases very simply, if and when, 
they move up the league ladder and begin to receive later draft picks. 
107 B Dabschek, 'Trying Times: Collective Bargaining in Australian Rugby Union' (1998) 15 
Sporting Traditions 25 at 43-4. 
108 P Jenkins, 'Players Strike it Rich in New Deal' , The Australian, 12 April 200 1. Note too that 
there have been calls from within rugby union for the introduction of a salary cap with both 
the ACT Brumbies and the Queensland Reds being concerned about the potential financial 
might that would be generated by a successful NSW Waratahs franchise. See W Smith, 
'Brumbies, Reds call for salary cap, The Australian, 19 May 2005. 
109 Cricket Australia recently tried to reduce the figure to 20 per cent so that Cricket Australia 
would have more money available for promotion and development of the game. The players, 
however, stood firm and Cricket Australia was forced to retain the figure at 25 per cent. 
110 [1997) 3 NZLR 30 I. 
I I I [1997] 3 NZLR 30 I at 304-5. 
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also reflect on some figures from European soccer where uncontrolled 
increases in player payments has seen many clubs face financial problems. In 
2003 eighty per cent of Italian Serie A clubs were reported to be in severe 
financial strife, with the fact that player wages devour 85 per cent of the 
revenue being a major contributing factor. I 12 Players from AS Roma, which 
has recently won a league title, reportedly had to sue the club for unpaid 
wages, while one of the giants of European and Spanish soccer, Barcelona, 
reported a $97 million loss for the 2002-03 financial year. l13 It is not 
surprising, therefore, that there have been suggestions that not only would a 
salary cap prove to be the solution to the problems experienced by Italy's Serie 
A,114 but also that it might be used in other European Leagues.1l5 As 
previously mentioned, in the United States the NFL has a well-enforced salary 
cap in operation, and this has, in conjunction with a draft system, arguably 
created an even competition. 116 
Thus, there has been a perceived need to implement a salary cap in a large 
market like the United States, or introduce one into another large market, like 
European soccer. It is suggested that the argument that one is needed in a 
smaller market like Australia, where the revenue that can be generated is 
considerably smaller, is perhaps even more compelling than it is for larger 
markets. 
Conclusion 
Creating and maintalOlOg an even competitIOn constitutes a protectable 
interest for a sporting league. In Australia the AFL, NRL and the A-League all 
seek to justify the implementation of a salary cap on the basis that it creates 
a more even and financially more viable competition. It is suggested that the 
pse examples presented in this paper indicate that the salary caps in these 
competitions are working well. The amount of money that some players have 
had to take in pay cuts due to the salary cap has been relatively small. At the 
same time, while there are examples of players who could not choose the club, 
that is, the employer, of their choice, these represent a very small minority, 
given the hundreds of players that are employed each year by the clubs in 
these competitions. From the players' perspective it is also suggested that their 
standard playing contracts do offer some protection, either in the AFL to deny 
112 'Serie A clubs face financial chasm' The Sydney Morning Herald, 20 December 2003 at 36. 
113 'Barca's disposal', The Australian, 7 May 2003 at 19. 
114 'Italians don cap', The Weekend Australian, 10-11 November 2001 at 63. 
115 'Bid for salary cap', The Australian, 30 May 2001. 
116 In regard to the NFL, even with salary cap and draft system there have been dominant teams, 
for instance, the Green Bay Packers in the 1960s, the Pittsburgh Steelers in the 1970s, the 
San Francisco 49' ers in the J 980s, the Dallas Cowboys in the J 990s, and in recent years, the 
New England Patriots. However, such a dominance has only lasted for five to 10 years and 
it has also been a different team in each decade that has dominated. Major League baseball 
on the other hand, which does not have a salary cap, has tended to have been dominated in 
each decade by the team with the biggest payroll, the New York Yankees. All the European 
soccer leagues are likewise dominated by the biggest and richest clubs: for example, in 
England it is Manchester United, Arsenal, and more recently, Chelsea; in Spain it is 
Barcelona and Real Madrid; Germany, Bayem Munich; Scotland, Celtic and Rangers. 
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a club the opportunity to trade them by holding the club to that contract, or by 
treating a request to take a pay cut as a breach of contract, thus enabling that 
player to join another club. 
